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Abstract 
This paper provides an approximation to the measurement of public sector wage gaps in 
Spanish regions. By using data from the European Community Household Panel, it is shown 
that the balance between what private firms pay in the local market and what the public 
sector pays, differs substantially in different areas of the country. Public sector wage 
differences among Spanish regions are mostly due to differences in returns, not to differences 
in characteristics or to selection effects, and are not constant across gender, educational 
levels, or occupations. Moreover, in those regions where Regional Governments have a 
higher weight in public employment, public wage gaps are higher and public employers pay 
higher returns. There also seems to be a cross-regional positive correlation between public 
wage gaps and unemployment, and a negative one between labour productivity and 
public wage gaps. Hence, a tentative conclusion is that the incentives to select into the public 
sector are higher in the low productivity regions, precisely those where scarcity of human 
capital in the private sector may be the most important factor for explaining economic 
backwardness. 
 
     
All 20.0%  9.0% 13.5% 35.4% 
Males 16.5%  8.3% 12.3% 29.7% 
Females 25.1%  10.4% 15.4% 41.4% 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
Public sector wage gaps are relevant in many dimensions. First, regarding fiscal 
policy, public wages constitute the main bulk of government consumption. Secondly, work 
organisations in the public sector differ in many senses from the private sector, as stressed by 
the literature on incentives in public organisations.2 Because of the relatively higher strength 
of trade unions in the public sector and also due to incentive/equity considerations, wage 
structures use to be less unequal in the public sector. In this regard, the study of the 
wage structure in the public sector provides evidence on the institutional factors determining 
the pay practices of public employers. Thirdly, as skilled biased technological progress, 
international integration and changes in labour supply patterns are very much affecting the 
wage structure of the private sector, there are also reasons to believe that the wage structure 
is also changing in the public sector. Fourthly, there could be spill-over effects from public 
wages to private wages. Apart from “demonstrations effects”, wages and employment 
conditions in the public sector affect labour supply to the private sector, and, hence, to the 
composition of employment and wages that prevail in the private sector. For instance, if 
the public sector pays above the private sector the latter may feel compelled to raise the 
rates it pays certain types of labour to match those offered in the public sector. The resulting 
higher private sector costs lower competitiveness of the traded goods sector in the regions 
where public sector wage gaps are higher. Thus, if in a particular region incentives to select 
into public employment are particularly intense, then there could be a lack of human capital in 
the private sector lowering regional competitiveness and growth. 
In this paper we estimate public sector wage gaps in Spanish regions. 
Cross-regional wage inequality within the public sector is typically lower than in the private 
sector. Hence, public sector wage gaps ought to be higher in those sectors where 
private sector wages are lower. The Spanish labour market provides a very interesting case 
study for the issues at hand when discussing the consequences of the public sector for 
                                                           
1. As for the international literature see, for instance, Gregory and Borland (1999) for a survey, Borjas (2002) for the US 
experience, and Lucifora and Meurs (2004) for analysis of public sector wage gaps in Great Britain, Italy and France. 
A recent reference for Spain is Albert et al. (1999). 
2. See, for instance, Dixit (2000) and Prendergast (1999). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0526
1 Introduction
In Spain one out of every five employees, one out of every four female employees, and 
about one out of every three employees with a university degree work for the public 
sector (see Table 1). Despite the high incidence of public sector employment, there is a lack 
of studies identifying the impact of the public sector segment of the labour market onto the 
private one. For instance, the voluminous empirical literature estimating gaps between wages 
in the public and private sectors has only a few entries for Spain.1
Table 1. Proportion of public sector employees, Spain, 2004 
All
Primary 
Education 
Secondary 
Education 
Tertiary 
education 
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regional labour markets and, in particular, the impact of the public sector employment 
practices onto regional development. A tentative list of reasons is the following: 
–– First, besides the scope of the segment of the public sector labour market, Spain is 
one of the countries where there are typically several hundred, even thousands, applicants 
for each public sector job in offer, while in some occupations employers in the private 
sector find it difficult to hire new workers. 
–– Secondly, there are noticeable and persistent regional differences in the Spanish 
labour markets. Employment and unemployment rates, the incidence of “atypical” 
(i.e., temporary, seasonal, part-time) employment, wages, and other employment 
conditions differ significantly across Spanish regions.3 In spite of these differences, there is 
not much mobility across regions, although intraregional labour mobility has noticeably 
increased along the 1990s.4 
–– Thirdly, Spain has a quasi-federal structure with a continuously increasing weight of 
regional and local governments. After the transition to a democratic regime in the 
late 1970s, a process of political devolution, that is not yet completely resolved, produced 
a significant transfer of human resources from the Central Administration to Regional 
Governments and Local Corporations.  While the wages and employment conditions of 
Central Administration’s employees do not typically change across Spanish regions, 
Regional Governments and Local Corporations can introduce some differences in wage 
and employment conditions of their employees. This, together with the previous point, 
suggests that there is significant cross-regional variability in wage and other employment 
conditions of public sector employees. 
–– Finally, along the 1980s and 1990s there had been some relevant changes in the 
institutional configuration of the labour market, mostly affecting to the private sector 
but also with some consequences for the public sector. As a result of these changes, 
there could be expected significant shifts in the wage structures of both sectors, on top 
of the shifts which conceivably could have been produced by the usual suspects in the 
literature regarding the evolution of wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s 
(biased-technological progress, international trade, changes in the composition of labour 
supply, etc.). 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional 
framework of the public and private labour markets in Spain, highlighting some recent reforms 
which have resulted, first, in a large increase of temporary employment in the private sector 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, and, then some decrease in the private sector and a rise in 
the public sector of that kind of employment after the mid-1990s. It also provides a first 
comparison of wages in the public and private sectors in Spanish regions using average data 
from National Accounts and the administrative registers of public employees, and some 
information about the regional variation of the composition of employment across regions to 
qualify, in some dimensions, the sizes of the gaps. Section 3 describes the data, taken from 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP, henceforth), and the estimation 
procedure used in our microeconometric analysis of regional public sector wage gaps. 
Section 4 presents our main results, showing that the balance between what private firms 
                                                           
3. See Bentolila and Jimeno (1998). 
4. See Arellano and Bover (2002). 
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and what the public sector pay in the local markets, differs substantially in several areas of 
Spain so that, after controlling for individual characteristics and sorting of workers into 
sectors, public sector wages relative to private sector wages increase with unemployment 
and decreases with labour productivity across Spanish regions. We also find that the higher 
the weight in public employment of regional governments is, the higher public sector wage 
gaps are. Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. 
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2 Institutional framework of the Spanish labour market 
This section provides institutional details of the pay-setting arrangements in the public 
and private sectors in Spain, focusing in particular on the degree of centralisation and 
decentralisation in these arrangements and in recent labour market reforms that have 
changed the incidence of permanent employment. It also presents descriptive statistics 
of ‘raw’, unadjusted, regional pay differentials in the public and private sectors, according to 
information from National Accounts and administrative registers of public employees. 
The regional variation of these statistics is put into perspective by offering also some analysis 
of the regional variation in the composition of public employment along several dimensions 
such as age groups, gender, educational attainments and employment status. 
2.1 The public sector 
In Spain the employment conditions of public sector employees may be regulated either 
by administrative legislation or by the labour legislation. The employment conditions of 
civil servants (funcionarios) are regulated by administrative legislation. Access to employment 
is by public and open examinations, and civil servants enjoy full employment security. 
Their wages are determined by the corresponding employer, which may be the 
Central Administration, Regional Governments and Local Corporations. There are several 
components of civil servants’ wages depending on the occupational level (5 groups ranked by 
the educational attainment level required for the post), job position (30 categories), 
remuneration for special dedication, ability, responsibility or  risk (up to 150 categories), 
seniority, productivity, and compensation for extraordinary services, working overtime, or 
special working time schedules. Civil servants working for the Central Administration receive 
the same wage package regardless of the region of residence. However, Regional 
Governments and Local Corporations have some flexibility at adjusting the remuneration of 
civil servants working for them. Although there are informal negotiations with trade unions 
and employees representatives, formal collective bargaining agreements are not in effect and 
changes in the employment conditions are implemented by changes in the corresponding 
administrative legislation. 
There is a second class of public sector employees, named personal laboral, whose 
employment conditions are determined by the same labour legislation which applies 
to employees in the private sector, and that we sketch in the next section. In this case, 
employment conditions are determined by formal collective bargaining, and the proportion of 
this type of public sector employees may differ depending on the characteristics of the public 
sector employer, not only on its geographical scope (Central Administration, Regional 
Governments, etc) but also on the activity being provided (health, teaching, etc.). 
It is also important to note that the distribution of government functions among the 
Central Administration, Regional Governments and Local Corporations have dramatically 
changed in the last two decades. From a situation in which the Central Administration was 
in charge of almost all public services, nowadays there are several services which are 
completely transferred to Regional Governments and Local Corporations. For instance, the 
provision of education (even at the university level) and the health system is a responsibility of 
regional governments.5 This leads us to pay a particular attention to these two sectors below 
in our microeconometric analysis of public sector wage gaps. 
 
                                                           
5. There is more discussion of the composition of public employment at the regional level in Section 2.3. 
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2.2 The private sector 
The employment conditions at the private sector of the Spanish labour market are mostly 
determined through collective bargaining between employers and employees representatives. 
Negotiations take place at different levels (nations, sector of activity, firm, plant) and the 
coverage rate of collective bargaining agreements are above 80%, although only about 15% 
of employees are covered by a firm-level collective agreement. The main law regulating 
collective bargaining was passed in 1980. Since the mid-1980s, there have been very 
few changes regarding the structure and contents of the Spanish collective bargaining 
system. 
Besides the regulation of collective bargaining, the Spanish labour law is very 
stringent regarding Employment Protection Legislation. The usual indicators of EPL strictness 
rank Spain at the top of OECD countries regarding firing restrictions of permanent employees. 
In this respect, labour market reforms since the early 1980s have been addressed at 
changing the nature and incidence of “atypical” employment contracts (fixed-term, temporary, 
part-time). In 1984, fixed-term contracts were promoted by allowing firms to hire employees 
under this type of contracts for any kind of job, seasonal or not. Very soon, the proportion of 
employees with fixed-term employment contracts surpassed 30% and the proportion of new 
hires under this type of contract was about 95%. In the 1990s, several reforms have tried to 
reduce the scope of temporary employment. In 1994 the reasons for “fair dismissals” were 
widened, while in 1997 a new permanent contract with lower firing costs for objective 
dismissals was put in place.6 
Both the regulation of collective bargaining and EPL provisions apply to private 
sector employees and to public sector employees who are not civil servants, that is, who are 
hired under the labour code. After the EPL reforms of the 1990s, the proportion of 
employees with fixed-term contracts have diminished in the private sector (by about 6 pp 
since the mid 1990s) but have increased in the public sector (by 5 pp in the same time 
period). While the reduction of fixed-term employment in the private sector is though to be 
related to the lowering of non-wage labour costs under permanent contracts implied 
by the reforms7, the rise of temporary employment in the public sector is thought to be 
related to the higher incidence of subsidised employment in the public sector, as a form of 
Active Labour Market Policies, and further restrictions for hiring civil servants due to budgetary 
reasons.8 
2.3 Public sector wage gaps in Spanish regions: Some preliminary comparisons 
The distribution of public employment at the three layers (Central Administration, Regional 
Governments and Local Corporations) at each Spanish region is plotted in Figure 1.9 As can 
be seen, there are noticeable differences in the structure of public employment in Spanish 
regions. Not surprisingly, in Madrid the Central Administration employs about 45% of public 
employees. In contrast, Regional Governments and Local Corporations account for the 
largest bulk of public employment (75% or higher) in most of the rest of the country. 
Regional wage differences in Spain are noticeable and persistent. Average 
compensation per employee in 2002 ranged from about 20,300 euros/year in Extremadura to 
                                                           
6 There are many papers documenting and analysing temporary employment in Spain. See, for instance, 
Dolado et al (2002) for a survey. 
7. Kugler et al. (2004). 
8. Dolado et al. (2002). 
9. Regions are classified according to the EUROSTAT’s NUTS2 codes. 
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Central Administration Regional Government
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Andalusia 17,943 18,235 18,686 19,082 19,637 20,212 20,825 21,708 
Aragon 20,002 21,204 21,515 22,149 22,939 23,728 24,560 25,431 
Asturias 20,437 21,130 21,712 22,518 22,831 23,583 24,308 25,150 
Balearic Islands 20,108 21,167 22,012 22,379 22,973 23,658 24,418 25,558 
Canary Islands 19,380 20,107 20,475 20,800 21,083 21,890 22,638 23,743 
Cantabria 20,116 21,083 21,830 22,738 23,566 24,155 25,089 25,915 
Castille-Leon 18,843 20,158 20,547 21,294 22,138 23,148 23,968 24,800 
Castille-La Mancha 17,076 18,222 18,220 18,633 19,480 20,229 21,082 21,964 
Catalonia 20,976 21,801 22,337 22,958 23,447 24,454 25,558 26,617 
Valencia 17,547 18,536 19,045 19,633 19,989 20,698 21,733 22,527 
Extremadura 15,466 16,582 16,983 17,505 17,833 18,731 19,480 20,315 
Galicia 17,114 18,439 18,834 19,312 19,845 20,377 21,183 22,149 
Madrid 22,581 23,350 24,322 25,163 25,765 26,852 27,894 28,866 
Murcia 16,393 17,386 17,490 17,829 18,379 19,325 20,280 21,167 
Navarre 21,555 23,184 23,551 24,350 24,918 26,071 27,137 28,192 
Basque Country 23,153 24,224 24,881 25,648 26,452 27,387 28,273 29,285 
La Rioja 19,003 20,160 20,625 21,581 22,542 23,680 24,846 25,645 
 
Source: National Accounts. 
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more than 29.000 euros/year in the Basque Country (see Table 2). Furthermore, there are no 
signs of convergence across regions in this regard. As a first approximation to measuring 
public sector wage gaps in Spanish regions, we rely on National Accounts data. We compare 
average compensation per employee in the non-market sector of the economy (mostly, the 
public sector) to the same variable in the market sector (mostly, the private sector).  Within 
the former we consider four branches: education, health and social services, non-market 
services, and public administration. 
Figure 1. Distribution of Public Employment 
Local Corporations
Notes: It excludes personal laboral. Source: Register of public employment. 
Table 2: Average compensation per employee, 1995-2002 
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As seen in Figure 2, there is a wide regional variation in public wage gaps defined 
along these lines. In education the gap in average compensation per employee 
between the non-market and the market sector ranges from 0.92 in the Valencia to about 1.7 
in Navarre; in health and social services it ranges from 1.2 in Catalonia to about 2 in 
Extremadura. Wage gaps between the non-market and market service sectors range from 
0.69 in Madrid to about 1.09 in Canary Islands, while for compensation per employee in 
Public Administration relative to total compensation per employee (excluding the non-market 
sector) the range is between 0.73 in Madrid and 1.3 in the Basque Country.10 
Another relevant fact of the evolution of public employment over the recent 
years is the rapid expansion of temporary employment, whose incidence in the public 
sector was about 16% in the mid-1990s and is nowadays above 22%. This rise was 
mainly due to the increasing use of temporary contracts by Regional Governments and 
Local Corporations, although the proportion of fixed-term public employees also increased in 
Central Administrations. As already mentioned, budget restrictions imposed by fiscal 
consolidation and the widespread use of short-term contracts in programmes associated to 
Active Labour Market Policies seem to explain such a development [Dolado et al. (2002)].  
There are also wide differences in the incidence of temporary employment across population 
groups (by age, gender and skills), regions and sectors of activity. And there is empirical 
evidence of a relatively stable wage gap of about 9% between permanent and temporary 
workers (once individual characteristics and job attributes are controlled for).11 Given the 
heterogeneous composition of public employment and the different selection effects which 
may be present at the regional level, the comparison of average wage gaps across regions is 
not very informative. As an illustration, we have estimated the probability of having a 
temporary contract in the public sector (conditional on working for the public sector). The 
sample is from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the 1995-2001 period, 
which is also the one used for the estimation of public sector wage gaps below.12 
The results are in Table 3. As can be seen, even after controlling for individual 
characteristics some regional differences remain. In Andalusia, Asturias, Canary Islands, 
Castille-La Mancha, Valencia, Extremadura, Galicia, Murcia, Navarre and the Basque Country 
temporary employment is more prevalent within the public sector. To some extent this 
resembles regional differences in temporary employment in the private sector, where 
Andalusia, Aragon, Castille-Leon, Castille-La Mancha, Extremadura, Galicia and Murcia are 
the regions with a higher proportion of temporary employees.13 
 
                                                           
10. All these values refer to the mean throughout the period 1995-2001. 
11. See, for instance, Jimeno and Toharia (1993) de la Rica (2004) and Davia and Hernanz (2004). 
12. More details on the construction of the sample are given in Section 3. 
13. García-Pérez and Rebollo (2004) find that regional differences in labour costs and in productivity explain the largest 
bulk of the regional differences in the incidence of temporary employment. 
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                                      Table 3. Probability of holding a temporary job 
 PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
          
Variables Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. 
          
Male  -0.439  -8.71  -0.069  -2.74 
Secondary Education  -0.289  -3.72  -0.135  -4.55 
University Education  -0.400  -5.35  -0.187  -5.70 
Married  -0.356  -4.56  0.036  1.03 
Number of children  0.031  1.09  -0.026  -1.85 
Age  0.004  0.19  -0.046  -6.13 
Age (square)  0.000  -1.28  0.000  4.01 
Big firm (+500 e.)  0.046  0.79  -0.326  -7.44 
Part-time job  0.325  2.94  0.489  11.09 
Tenure  -0.386  -28.38  -0.434  -63.11 
Tenure (square)  0.014  21.77  0.018  55.42 
Managers  0.372  2.06  -0.803  -8.84 
Professionals  0.016  0.18  -0.524  -14.35 
Clerks  -0.278  -2.82  -0.624  -13.49 
Semi-skilled workers  0.060  0.59  -0.294  -9.72 
Andalusia  0.308  3.19  1.172  3.41 
Aragon  0.159  1.27  0.923  2.12 
Asturias  0.599  4.71  0.877  1.97 
Balearic Islands  -0.068  -0.37  -1.075  -2.91 
Canary Islands  0.291  2.63  0.223  0.72 
Cantabria  0.122  0.74  0.457  1.43 
Castille-Leon  0.168  1.34  1.129  2.39 
Castille-La Mancha  0.265  2.13  1.337  2.57 
Catalonia  -0.023  -0.20  -0.077  -0.14 
Valencia  0.489  4.32  0.417  1.20 
Extremadura  0.578  4.80  1.479  2.37 
Galicia  0.238  2.02  0.924  2.26 
Murcia  0.375  2.79  1.044  2.85 
Navarre  0.301  2.18  1.045  1.49 
Basque Country  0.617  4.76  1.002  1.84 
La Rioja  -0.400  -1.94  0.824  1.28 
Spouse with University Education   0.045  0.58  -0.211  -4.67 
Spouse with Secondary Education  0.061  0.74  -0.204  -5.02 
Spouse in the Public Sector  0.006  0.08  -0.120  -2.06 
Industry    -2.224  -0.72 
Construction    2.061  0.66 
Services    4.212  1.36 
Non profit services    -11.297  -2.31 
Constant term   1.262  3.40  1.320  0.53 
     
Number of observations  6.925   21.313  
Log likelihood =   -1,874.925   -8,804.115  
 
Note: Time dummies included. The constant term represents a woman with primary education, single, working in Madrid in a firm 
with less than 500 employees and in an unskilled position
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3 Microeconometric analysis 
3.1 Data 
The analysis of the Spanish wage structure is hindered by lack of appropriate data. The 
structural wage survey collected by the Statistical Office (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial) only 
covers the private sector and is available only for 1995 and 2001. The Labour Force Survey 
does not collect information on wages. Hence, for information on wages of public sector 
employees, we are left with occasional surveys, which give information not comparable, neither 
across time nor across units. The only statistical source that provides some microeconomic 
information on this matter is the European Community Household Panel survey (ECPH). 
The ECHP is based on a survey that is annually carried out on a sample of households. It has a 
panel dimension so it allows us to follow the labour market performance of individuals through 
time. Individual characteristics, employment status and economic variables are obtained 
together with some characteristics of the household. Most of the variables describe the 
individual’s and household’s situation at the moment of the interview or refer to the current 
month of the interview. However, some variables related to individual and household annual 
earnings refer to the previous year. Another important feature of the survey is that individuals 
are requested to indicate labour earnings, among other income sources. 
For the sake of this analysis, this data set has some advantages (comparability across 
countries, sufficient information on individual, family and job characteristics, a panel structure, 
etc.) and one main disadvantage, a small sample size, which prevents from estimating public 
wage gaps with a high degree of precision.14 
Thus, we use the European Community Household Panel survey (ECPH) from 1995 to 
2001 to estimate characteristics-adjusted public sector wage gaps. Wages are measured in 
real terms and in an hourly basis (using the CPI to deflate nominal monthly earnings provided 
by the ECHP and normal working hours to convert monthly earnings into hourly wages), and 
are expressed in euros (at constant prices, 2000). 
We start off by taking a look at the main sample characteristics of our data for public 
and private sector workers. Table 4 shows some descriptive statistics of our sample. Level of 
studies consists of three dummy variables that classify the levels of studies as university, 
secondary, and primary education. Gender is a dummy variable that takes value one if the 
worker is male; Marital Status takes value one if the worker is married and zero otherwise; 
other unemployment experience takes value one if, before the previous job, the individual 
experienced a spell of unemployment; Tenure in the previous job is measured in years and has 
been divided into four categories. The sample has roughly a similar percentage of public 
employees as the LFS, with women having a higher weight in public employment than 
in private employment, and public employees being relatively more educated, with longer 
tenure, and occupying professional positions. As for regions, public employment has 
an incidence above the average in Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias Castille-La Mancha and 
Extremadura. Hourly wages are about 44% higher in the public sector, on average. This is the 
result of three factors: i) higher earnings in the public sector, ii) longer working hours in 
the private sector, and iii) an employment composition of public employment characterised 
by more educated, longer tenured workers, and professionals. The hourly wage gap is even 
higher for women, and for employees in Andalusia, Cantabria, Galicia and the Canary Islands. 
                                                           
14. Also, unfortunately, the survey does not provide information on the characteristics of the public employer (Central 
Administration, Regional Government or Local Corporation). 
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                             Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and mean hourly wages (in euros 2000) 
  PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR     
  % TOTAL (log) WAGE  % TOTAL (log) WAGE  WAGE GAP % # OBSERV. 
All 24.52% 2.23 75.48% 1.78 44.37%  28,238 
Males 21.32% 2.24 78.68% 1.86 38.43%  18,201 
Females 30.34% 2.21 69.66% 1.63 57.78%  10,037 
Permanent employment 
contract 30.44% 2.32 69.56% 1.96 35.90%  18,417 
Fixed-term employment 
 contract 13.43% 1.85 86.57% 1.52 32.72%  9,821 
tenure<=3 13.07% 1.91 86.93% 1.59 31.75%  11,955 
tenure 3-15 28.61% 2.26 71.39% 1.86 39.18%  7,722 
tenure>15 36.84% 2.37 63.16% 2.08 28.83%  8,561 
Primary studies 12.85% 1.91 87.15% 1.66 25.47%  13,525 
Secondary studies 22.98% 2.09 77.02% 1.81 27.78%  5,963 
Tertiary studies 43.62% 2.42 56.38% 2.06 35.81%  8,75 
Andalusia 27.42% 2.17 72.58% 1.65 52.01%  3,545 
Aragon 30.73% 2.25 69.27% 1.88 37.02%  1,292 
Asturias 34.72% 2.26 65.28% 1.79 46.61%  844 
Balearic Islands 20.69% 2.25 79.31% 1.74 50.21%  759 
Canary Islands 25.51% 2.18 74.49% 1.62 56.06%  1,776 
Cantabria 25.03% 2.29 74.97% 1.68 61.45%  931 
Castille-Leon 25.94% 2.26 74.06% 1.78 48.05%  1,577 
Castille-La Mancha 27.51% 2.15 72.49% 1.64 51.12%  1,265 
Catalonia 18.96% 2.32 81.04% 1.96 35.43%  3,212 
Valencia 18.85% 2.16 81.15% 1.69 46.88%  2,419 
Extremadura 34.50% 1.94 65.50% 1.63 30.96%  974 
Galicia 25.47% 2.22 74.53% 1.57 65.35%  1,763 
Madrid 25.80% 2.38 74.20% 2.01 36.16%  3,271 
Murcia 23.87% 2.07 76.13% 1.59 48.41%  1,328 
Navarre 24.24% 2.32 75.76% 1.91 41.02%  1,023 
Basque Country 18.30% 2.41 81.70% 2.04 37.18%  1,519 
La Rioja 17.03% 2.06 82.97% 1.82 23.93%  740 
Managers 16.25% 2.64 83.75% 2.61 2.85%  714 
Professionals 45.80% 2.38 54.20% 1.94 43.42%  9,604 
Clerks 30.80% 2.01 69.20% 1.89 11.89%  3,149 
Semi-skilled workers 7.25% 2.02 92.75% 1.73 29.04%  10,34 
Unskilled workers 15.57% 1.72 84.43% 1.50 22.67%  4,431 
 
                                                                                                       Source: ECHP.  
 
Finally, Table 5 shows some interesting facts regarding how public sector wage gaps 
depend on the characteristics of the public employer. In this regard, the best examples are the 
health and the education systems, whose management was transferred from the Central 
Administration to Regional Governments in all the regions, but at different moment in time. 
Thus, whereas there are some regions that had this competence since the early eighties, 
others have only acquired it at the end of the nineties. In Table 5 it is shown that those regions 
which had these competences for a longer period show, in average, larger wage gaps between 
the public and the private sectors, both in health and education. Moreover, in the case of 
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education, public sector wage gaps noticeably increased after competences were transferred 
from Central Administration to Regional Governments. 
Table 5. Average wage gaps by region: Effect of having the competence on Health and 
Education 
  HEALTH EDUCATION 
  YEAR 
of transfer 
wage gap  
(average 
1995-2001) 
YEAR 
of transfer 
Average 
wage gap 
(before the 
transfer) 
Average 
wage gap 
(after 
the transfer) 
Andalusia 1984  16,0% 1982   51,8% 
Aragon 2002  2,3% 1998 35,4% 48,2% 
Asturias 2002  6,9% 1999 35,3% 60,4% 
Balearic Islands 2002  26,5% 1997 58,5% 61,9% 
Canary Islands 1994  61,4% 1983  52,9% 
Cantabria 2002  45,4% 1998 28,6% 71,8% 
Castille-Leon 2002  49,3% 1999 51,6% 58,5% 
Castille-La Mancha 2002  23,5% 1999 71,1% 42,3% 
Catalonia 1981  15,1% 1980  30,7% 
Valencia 1987  38,6% 1983  34,0% 
Extremadura 2002  12,0% 1999 23,5% 38,2% 
Galicia 1990  36,3% 1982  50,5% 
Madrid 2002  21,0% 1999 16,0% 24,4% 
Murcia 2002  20,8% 1999 43,2% 55,3% 
Navarre 1990  33,6% 1990  27,9% 
Basque Country 1987  34,5% 1980  42,1% 
La Rioja 2002  2,4% 1998 18,7% 56,5% 
 
Note: For the education sector, the year of the transfer refers to the year in which the non-university education system 
began to be managed by the corresponding Regional Government. 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
Pay differentials between the public and the private sectors have been traditionally measured 
by estimating earnings/wage equations [see Mincer (1974)] using microeconomic databases. 
However, since some individual and job characteristics are not observed, an omitted variable 
bias is likely to be present in the estimation of Mincerian equations. Another bias which can 
arise in the estimation of these equations is the well known self-selection bias, arising form the 
fact that the employment status of a given individual depends on variables which also affect 
wages. 
To eliminate the selectivity bias, we follow the traditional approach. We specify the 
probability of an individual being in a certain employment status as a function of individual 
characteristics. This probability acts as the selection equation in a Switching Regression Model 
for wages in both the public and the private sector. In this framework, the source of 
endogeneity is the existence of unobservable variables that could be correlated with the 
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observable and non-observable characteristics in the wage equation and that simultaneously 
influence the likelihood of a given worker being in the public sector.15 
We consider a situation where for each sampled observation only one among the two 
dependent variables Wj –wages– is observed. Specifically, the observations on our dependent 
variable can be classified into two regimes, public and private sector respectively, which are 
generated by different probability laws: 
j j j jW X uβ= + , j=1,2 (1) 
 
where Wj represents potential wages for a worker in state 1 (public sector) or 0 (private sector), 
Xj is the set of observable determinants of wages and uj represents the unobservable 
component of wages, which are assumed to be normal with variance 
2
ju
σ . The selection 
mechanism is described through a latent variable model that describes the propensity towards 
being in one of the two possible states. As it is common in the latent variable approach, it is not 
possible to observe I*, but only its realization: 
*
*
1 0
0 0
I I
I I
= ⇔ >
= ⇔ ≤  (2) 
that is, the worker will be observed in one state if the total value associated with this state is 
greater than the value in every other possible state. The latent variable model may be 
interpreted as a reduced form approach, where supply and demand side effects mix and 
cannot be disentangled. This implies that the behaviour of the worker and the functioning of the 
labour market jointly generate what we observe, I. The estimated coefficients of the explanatory 
variables therefore capture the joint effect of genuine preferences of the worker and the 
employer’s preferences as regards the worker’s characteristics. And therefore we have that: 
1W W= ,  if  * 0I >  
2W W= ,  if  * 0I ≤  (3) 
 
We assume that Ij depends on observable and unobservable variables: 
*I Zγ ε= +  (4) 
 
where Z represents a vector of individual specific explanatory variables that describes the 
determinants of the selection process, γ is the corresponding vector of unknown parameters to 
be estimated and ε is the random component of the selection equation. This equation can be 
easily estimated using a probit specification. The basic assumption in this model is that the 
error terms in both the wage and the selection equations may be correlated (the correlation 
coefficients between these two elements are denoted, respectively, by
1 2
and u uε ερ ρ ). 
Given the fact that we are interested in estimating jointly the wage equations 
and the selection process, the likelihood function has to add the information relative to 
the wage process and to take account of the endogeneity of the selection process. 
                                                           
15. Other papers applying this methodology to different aspects in the field of labor studies are, for example,  
Carrasco (2001), Pezzin and Schone (1999), Dustmann and van Soest (1998) or Prescott and Wilton (1992). 
( )
( )11 1 1/ 0 u
Z
E W I X
Zε
φ γβ ρ γ> = + Φ  (6) 
( ) ( )( )22 2 2/ 0 1u
Z
E W I X
Zε
φ γβ ρ γ< = − −Φ  (6’) 
 
These are the equations underlying our estimation of public sector wage gaps in 
Spanish regions. We will also use them to breakdown total wage differences in differences in 
returns, differences in individuals’ characteristics, and differences due to self-selection.18 
                                                           
16. An alternative is to estimate the model by simulated maximum likelihood. However, difficulty is usually encountered in 
the estimation of both mean equation and covariance parameters. 
17. The two-step estimators are never fully efficient in the sense that they never attain the Cramer-Rao lower bound. The 
efficient estimator is the full information maximum likelihood, which estimates the earnings and type of transition equations 
jointly. 
18. An alternative to identify “pure” public sector wage gaps would be to focus on “movers”, that is individual changing 
jobs from the public to the private sector and viceversa. However, in our sample the proportion of movers is too low (3.1% 
from the private to the public sector and 10.0% from the public sector to the private sector) as to allow for estimation of 
regional public sector wage gaps. 
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> ≤
= Φ > Φ ≤∏ ∏
We estimate the endogenous switching model by full maximum likelihood16 because 
this method is more efficient than the two step estimation method proposed by 
Heckman (1979).17 The likelihood function to be estimated has the following form:  
(5)
where the term ϕ(Wj) describes the density function of wages (j=1,2) and Φ(I*/Wj) the 
cumulative distribution function of the selection process conditional on wages. 
To test for the endogeneity of the switching model, the parameters of interest are the 
correlation coefficients between the error term of each wage equation and the error term of the 
selection equation. If these parameters are different from zero, then the selection process is not 
exogenous and the estimation of the wage equations by OLS would give inconsistent 
estimators of the parameters of the model. 
From the estimation of this model we obtain unconditional and conditional wage 
predictions. The unconditional prediction is defined as the average predicted wage for all 
individuals in the sample. The conditional wage prediction represents the mean predicted wage 
for each worker type. Thus, we have: 
( )
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4 Results 
4.1 Wage regressions 
We perform estimation of the previous model on five different samples: all workers, males, 
females, and workers in the education sector and in the health and social service sector, 
separately. The dependent variable is the log of hourly gross wage.19 As co-variates, we 
introduce individual characteristics, such as gender, age, tenure, occupation, marital status and 
number of children, besides time and regional dummies and the interactions of the latter with 
education and occupation. 20 21 
Regarding the selection equation, we need some identifying assumption, as that 
implied by some variable affecting the propensity of being in the public sector, but not wages. 
For this, we have used two types of variables. First, we thought of the spouse’s level of 
education and sector of affiliation as one important determinant of the propensity of being in 
the public sector. Secondly, we explore the idea that individuals in the public sector are likely to 
have a lower time discount rate and higher capital income. The justification for this is that, being 
entry into the public sector regulated through public examinations which typically involve 
several years of preparation, individuals who discount less the future and those who do not 
have financial constrains, are more likely to be in the public sector. Thus, we use the savings 
rate and capital income, as proxies of the time discount rate and of financial constraints, to 
predicting the likelihood of working in the public sector.22 
The estimation results are compiled in Appendix A, and are briefly summarised in what 
follows. Beginning with the selection equation for the full sample, females, singles, and those 
with a university degree are more likely to work in the public sector. The variables identifying the 
selection into the public sector (education level and employment status of the spouse, the 
saving rate, and capital income) are all statistically significant; especially noteworthy is that 
those individuals with the spouse working in the public sector are the most likely to work also in 
this sector. 
With respect to the wage equations, we find that the difference between males and 
females is larger in the private than in the public sector, where the gender gap is below 10% 
after controlling for observable characteristics.23 Returns to education are larger in the public 
sector, especially for those with a university degree.24 Also, the returns to a permanent contract 
                                                           
19. There are about 7% of moonlighters in our sample (4.58% of public employees and 2.44% of private employees). For 
the definition of employment status, we have used the declared main job, while the hourly wage also corresponds to the 
main job. 
20. We have not considered to introducing some kind of regional dependence across the parameters for each region, as, 
for instance, in a Geographically Weighted Regression. This technique weights each observation depending 
upon the points in space where the parameter estimates are expected to have more influence on the dependent 
variable that observations further away. In principle, labour mobility in response to wage differentials (both in the public and 
private sector) could imply some geographical dependence among the parameters of each region. But, a priori, it is quite 
difficult to anticipate the main patterns of this dependence as to impose it in the estimation procedure. 
21. We have also estimated alternative specifications with other co-variates, such as interaction terms between tenure and 
education, and tenure and type of contracts, without significant changes in the regional dummies we are interested in. 
22. As most identifying assumptions, these are not uncontroversial. The main problem is that we observe spouse 
characteristics and saving rates and capital income, not at the moment of joining either the public or the private sector, but 
at the current date. However, these variables are statistically significant for explaining the probability of being employed in 
the public sector, and the estimates of the wage equation do not qualitatively change when some of them are dropped 
from the selection equation.  
23. The same is obtained in Albert et al. (1999). 
24. Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1987) find the opposite result for a developing country. In the case of Spain, the main 
source of differences in the returns to a university degree between the public and the private sectors apply to women (see 
Tables A.2 and A.3). 
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are higher in the public sector. With respect to the household type, we find larger wages for 
married workers with children, both in the public and in the private sector. Finally, selection into 
both sectors seems to be driven by horizontal distribution of abilities. Since 
1uερ is estimated 
to be negative, the mean wage of public workers is higher compared to the mean wage that a 
randomly selected group of the population would have earned, were they employed in the 
public sector. Similarly, since 
2uερ is estimated to be negative, the mean wage of private 
workers is lower (see equation 6’) compared to the mean wage that a randomly selected group 
of the population woul  have earned, were they employed in the private sector. Below we 
correct for these sorting effects when estimating public sector wage gaps in Spanish regions. 
As for regional differences, all the regions, but one (the Basque Country), have lower 
wages in the public sector than Madrid. While, relative to Madrid, Balearic Islands, Canary 
Islands, Castille-Leon, Catalonia, and Navarre do not display statistically significant different 
wages in the public sector, Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Cantabria, Valencia, and, especially, 
Extremadura, Galicia, Murcia, and La Rioja, have lower wages in the public sector. In contrast, 
in the private sector, wages in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Navarre are higher than in 
Madrid, while the regions with the lowest wages are Cantabria, Murcia and Galicia.25 
Also noteworthy are the cross-regional differences in wage structures between 
sectors. Overall, managers, professionals, and clerks are relatively better paid in the private 
sector, whereas semi-skilled workers receive relatively better wages in the public sector. There 
are larger returns to a university degree in the public sector in the Center and in the Southern 
regions, while Clerks, Professionals and Semi-skilled workers have relatively higher returns 
outside the Center regions in the public sector, but not in the private sector. On the contrary, 
the private sector in the Center regions is the one with better wages for managers and 
professionals. 
Regarding the returns to individual characteristics from separate estimation of wage 
equations for males and females, the most noteworthy result is that returns to education and to 
tenure are higher for women than for men in the public sector. Other than that, we continue 
finding the main features obtained with the whole sample. As for regional differences, they are 
larger for women than for men, both in the public and in the private sectors. Finally, the 
correlation coefficients of non-observables in both groups show some interesting differences: 
although both coefficients are negative, the one for the public sector is more negative for males 
than for females, what shows that the negative self-selection into the public sector is more 
important for males than for females. 
We are particularly interested on regional public sector wage gaps in two particular 
occupations (teaching and health and social services) with a significant presence both in the 
public sector and in the private sector. As commented in Section 2, within the public sector, 
during the sample period these activities were to some extent transferred to Regional 
Governments and, hence, they are those where the scope for regional differentiation of 
wages is wider. We offer a separate estimation of our switching model for these two categories 
of workers. As for the teaching sector we find that the gender wage gap is not statistically 
significant in the public sector where it is about 11%, higher for men, in the private sector. 
Returns to education and to a permanent contract are higher in the public sector. Interestingly, 
in most regions wage in the public sector are higher than in Madrid, while it happens the 
contrary in the private sector. Finally, in the Health and Social Services sector we find a positive 
wage gap for males in both sectors26. Moreover, the returns to tenure and to a permanent 
                                                           
25. With the EHCP data, Ceuta and Melilla are included into Andalusia. 
26. For this case, it is not possible to include all regional dummies due to sample size problems. Thus, we group all 
regions into four aggregate zones. 
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contract are lower in this sector for public workers. We find no regional differences for these 
workers both in the public and the private sector. 
To confirm whether the wage gaps estimated with a switching regression model are 
robust to specification issues, we also consider the results from an alternative estimation 
of wage gaps using a random effects approach (see Table B.1 in Appendix B). Under this 
specification, the effects of all regressors are almost unchanged. Hence, the estimated wage 
gap and the breakdown between differences in characteristics and differences in returns are 
more or less the same under both approaches. 
We are also interested in whether the wage gaps between public and private sector 
workers are different depending on the level of the wage. That is, we want to observe gaps at 
different segments of the wage distribution, since it can be expected some smoothing of 
returns and of wage differences within the public sector. Hence, we have carried out three 
quartile regressions, at the 25%, 50% and 75% quartiles, in order to verify this hypothesis. The 
results from these regressions are shown in the Appendix (Tables B2-B4 in Appendix B), while 
the corresponding regional differences are plotted in Figure 3. As expected, public sector wage 
gaps are lower in the top tale of the wage distribution (11% in the 75% quartile) than in the 
bottom one (21.3% in the 25% percentile). Moreover, when we estimate separately these 
quartiles for workers in the public and in the private sector, we obtain that males are better paid 
in the private sector, being this difference the biggest in the top quartile. With respect to 
education, its return increases over the wage distribution, especially for those with a university 
degree in the South and in Madrid, whereas these differences are almost zero in the rest of the 
country. Finally, there exist also some interesting regional differences in this regard. For the top 
quartile, the differences with respect to Madrid in the public sector are the biggest in the South, 
whereas in the private sector, the main difference with respect to Madrid arises in the Northern 
regions that seem to pay less than Madrid along the whole wage distribution. 
Figure 3. Public sector wage gaps from quartile regressions  
 
4.2 A summary of estimated public wage gaps in Spanish regions 
Given the wage regressions commented above, we break down public sector wage gaps 
in differences of characteristics, returns, self-selection, and perform some regional 
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analysis of “adjusted” public sector wage gaps. We consider, respectively, the 
deterministic component of log-wages, and the deterministic component plus the 
conditional expectation of the stochastic component of log-wages, where the 
deterministic component is computed using the estimates from the joint estimation. 
Hence, with the decomposition of unconditional expectations we are applying the typical 
Oaxaca (1973) decomposition method to wage differentials adjusted for the selection bias 
[see Yun (1999)], so that it can be observed the main predictions of our switching 
regression model in terms of predicted conditional wages, both for public and private 
sector workers. The main results are reported in Table 6. 
According to our estimation results, the predicted conditional difference between 
public and private wages, in logs, is a bit larger (45.7%) than the observed statistical 
difference of wages between the public and the private sector (40.4%). This difference is 
due to the estimated negative effect of self-selection. Thus, the unobserved 
characteristics that make a given worker to be in the public sector will lower his expected 
conditional wage. On the contrary, non-observables affect to private sector workers 
making their wages to be higher than for the mean worker. Hence, without considering 
that the sample of workers in each sector is not a random sample, we would 
underestimate the difference between working in the public and in the private sector. 
Discounting sorting effects reduces significantly public sector wage gaps, as can 
be seen in the last column of Table 6. After this adjustment for sorting, the wage gap 
between public and private sector can be explained by differences in their characteristics, 
by about 51 percentage points (p.p.), whereas only 21.1 p.p. is due to different in returns 
to specific characteristics. Very interesting results are obtained when we split our sample 
between males and females. Firstly, we have that the wage gap is much larger for 
females (59.1%) than for males (39.7%).27 Moreover, we obtain a more significant effect 
of self-selection for males than for females. The former seem to suffer a more negative 
self-selection into the public sector that makes the real wage gap to be larger than when 
endogeneity is correctly taken into account. Women also suffer a negative self-selection 
into the public sector although the effect of self-selection is smaller. 
The results for the samples of workers in the health and teaching sectors reflect 
that the self-selection is even more negative in the first group whereas the effect for the 
latter group is less important. The wage gap in the sector of Health and Social Services is 
the lowest (all the observed difference is due to returns but it is completely compensated 
with a huge negative self-selection into the public sector). On the contrary, in the 
teaching sector the wage gap is more significant, being around 36.0%, because both the 
difference in returns and the self-selection effect are smaller for these workers. 
                                                           
27. The same is obtained in Albert et al. (1999) where, for 1994, the first wave of the ECHP, these gaps are, respectively, 
49.3% and 41.2%. In fact, public sector wage gaps for females seem to have increased during the last years of the 
Twentieth Century. 
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                          Table 6. Breakdown of Public Sector Wage Gaps in Spanish Regions 
  
Public sector     
(in logs) 
Private sector    
(in logs) 
Total Wage 
Gap 
Due 
to returns 
Due to 
characteristics 
Due to self-
selection 
Spain 2,24 1,78 45.7% 51.07% 21.12% -26.51% 
Men 2,25 1,85 39.7% 60.24% 19.95% -40.53% 
Women 2,21 1,62 59.1% 44.81% 28.11% -13.83% 
Health 2,46 2,27 18.8% 53.84% 20.90% -55.94% 
Teaching 2,49 2,13 35.7% 34.06% 15.04% -13.40% 
Spain (Random Effects) 2,19 1,76 43.2% 22.89% 20.30%  
REGIONAL ANALYSIS: 
Public sector 
(in logs) 
Private sector 
(in logs) 
Total Wage 
Gap   Due to returns
Due to 
characteristics 
 Due to self-
selection 
Andalusia 2,17 1,70 47.1% 51.89% 14.47% -19.22% 
Aragon 2,19 1,81 37.3% 47.25% 20.38% -30.35% 
Asturias 2,29 1,75 54.1% 52.52% 21.19% -19.65% 
Balearic Islands 2,32 1,81 51.0% 51.04% 23.05% -23.12% 
Canary Islands 2,27 1,69 57.5% 55.71% 17.97% -16.17% 
Cantabria 2,28 1,66 62.2% 58.62% 17.60% -14.00% 
Castille-Leon 2,23 1,73 49.9% 54.64% 20.90% -25.60% 
Castille-La Mancha 2,18 1,67 51.7% 54.21% 14.48% -16.99% 
Catalonia 2,34 1,92 41.7% 48.32% 31.62% -38.27% 
Valencia 2,22 1,75 46.3% 50.11% 18.38% -22.24% 
Extremadura 1,98 1,66 31.3% 44.02% 5.54% -18.31% 
Galicia 2,18 1,59 59.3% 58.09% 9.71% -8.51% 
Murcia 2,13 1,64 48.9% 51.94% 9.62% -12.81% 
Navarre 2,32 1,93 39.0% 47.07% 32.64% -40.69% 
Basque Country 2,41 1,95 46.0% 51.51% 40.18% -45.72% 
La Rioja 2,11 1,79 31.7% 45.13% 19.18% -32.62% 
Madrid 2,34 1,90 44.4% 47.04% 35.37% -38.02% 
  Public sector Private sector 
Private 
sector/Public 
sector  
Andalusia vs Madrid -16.04% -18.41% 1.148 
Aragon vs Madrid -14.31% -8.08% 0.565 
Asturias vs Madrid -5.28% -13.92% 2.635 
Balearic Islands vs Madrid -2.31% -8.53% 3.701 
Canary Islands vs Madrid -7.20% -18.71% 2.597 
Cantabria vs Madrid -6.24% -21.56% 3.452 
Castille-Leon vs Madrid -10.57% -15.42% 1.459 
Castille-La Mancha vs 
Madrid -14.79% -20.81% 1.407 
Catalonia vs Madrid -0.29% 2.40% -8.311 
Valencia vs Madrid -11.91% -13.62% 1.144 
Extremadura vs Madrid -30.74% -20.96% 0.682 
Galicia vs Madrid -15.08% -26.80% 1.777 
Murcia vs Madrid -19.31% -22.75% 1.178 
Navarre vs Madrid -2.31% 3.14% -1.364 
Basque Country vs Madrid 6.72% 5.09% 0.757 
La Rioja vs Madrid -20.65% -10.03% 0.486 
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Our main motivation for this exercise is to identifying differences between public 
and private sector wages across regions.28 In the second panel of Table 6 we show that 
the biggest wage gap is observed in the Northern and Southern regions, and that these 
differences in wage gaps are mostly due to differences in returns. Differences in characteristics 
and in sorting effects of self-selection, particularly noticeable in the high wage regions, such as 
the Basque Country, Navarre, Madrid, and Catalonia, are also noticeable (see Figure 4).29 The 
regions with the largest public sector wage gaps due to differences in returns are Cantabria, 
Galicia, Canary Islands, Asturias, Castille-La Mancha, and Castille-Leon. 
                          Figure 5. Regional wage differences (relative to Madrid)
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Finally, the bottom panel of Table 6 and Figure 5 show that the regional wage 
differences with respect to Madrid are lower in the public sector than in the private one, 
                                                           
28. We have checked that there are sufficient observations in each cell so that comparisons between public and private 
sector wages rely on estimates with a common support.  
29. The regions where the self-selection effect is more important are the ones with larger wages in the private sector 
(Catalonia, Navarre, the Basque Country and Madrid). Hence, in these regions public sector wage gaps are hided by the 
negative self-selection into the public sector. 
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confirming our prior that the wage structure in the public sector is more compressed than in 
the private sector. This is particularly true for the Northern regions (Asturias, Cantabria, Galicia) 
and for the Canary and Balearic Islands where the ratio between both differences is larger than 
1.8, that is, whereas the public sector in the North pays 10% less than in Madrid, in the private 
sector, where productivity should be taken much more in consideration, this ratio is almost 
18% lower. The same happens in the South (Castille-La Mancha, Murcia and Andalusia), 
although in this case the ratio between both differences is much lower, less than 1.4. 
4.3 Economic patterns in the cross-regional variation of public wage gaps 
Having broken down public sector wage gaps in different sources, we now search for some 
patterns in the cross-regional variation of public sector wage gaps.  We consider the total wage 
gap and the gap due to returns, being the latter the best measure of how the same skills are 
rewarded differentially in the public and private sectors. We relate these gaps to regional 
differences in the composition of public employment, labour productivity and unemployment. 
Previously, we have already noticed that with the transfer of public services from the 
Central Administration to Regional Governments, public wage gaps have tended to increase. 
Data plotted in Figure 6 suggest that there is indeed a positive correlation across regions 
between public sector wage gaps (both total and its component due to differences in returns) 
and the proportion of public employment under regional governments, although, 
admittedly, this correlation is somewhat blurred by three outliers (Extremadura, La Rioja and 
Navarre). This positive correlation can be interpreted in several ways. First, as stressed in 
the political economy literature, the closer the management of public employment to its 
political constituency is, the easier for public employees to extract rents is. Secondly, a lower 
fiscal responsibility of the regional governments could have softened their budget 
constraints, giving some leeway for additional wage increases for public employees. Finally, as 
public employment expands, public employers need to pay higher wages to attract 
more employees. Our conjecture is that all these three explanations play some role at 
explaining the correlation highlighted above. Unfortunately, with the data available we cannot 
attribute weights to each one of these hypothesis.  
Two important determinants of wages are productivity and unemployment. Higher 
productivity leads to higher wages both in the public and private sector, but, theoretically, 
to lower public wage gaps, insofar as public wages are conceivably less responsive to 
productivity. On the other hand, as stressed in the introduction, higher public wage gaps could 
create incentives for workers to enter into the public sector leaving less human capital available 
for the economic development of the private sector. In fact, Figure 7 shows that across 
Spanish regions there is a negative correlation between production per employee and public 
wage gaps, both regarding the total gaps and their component due to differences in returns. 
As for unemployment, there are several channels which could create a significant 
relationship with public wage gaps. Higher unemployment reduces workers’ reservation wages 
and, hence, tends to lower wages. Insofar as wages in the private sector are conceivably more 
affected by unemployment that public sector wages, a positive correlation between 
unemployment and public wage gaps should be expected. But there is an alternative 
explanation of this type of correlation, going from higher public wage gaps to higher taxes to 
financing public wages, and to lower employment creation in the private sector. In the Spanish 
case, as shown in Figure 8, there is a clear positive correlation between unemployment and 
public wage gaps (here the outliers seem to be Andalusia and Extremadura), regardless of 
whether the gap is measured by its total amount or by the component estimated as differences 
in returns. 
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        Figure 6.  Proportion of public employment at Regional Governments and public 
        sector wage gaps 
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                          Figure 7. GDP per employee and public sector wage gaps 
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                                Figure 8. Unemployment and public sector wage gaps 
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5 Concluding remarks 
This paper provides a first approximation to the measurement of public sector wage gaps in 
Spanish regions. We believe that this exercise is informative in several respects. First, since 
public sector wages in Spain can be differentiated across regions mostly by the action of 
Regional Governments and Local Corporations, it provides some information about how the 
wage structure in the public sector may change depending upon the scope of the public 
employer. We have shown that there are indeed sizeable public sector wage differences 
among Spanish regions which are mostly due to differences in returns, and to a lesser extent to 
differences in characteristics and to selection effects. 
Secondly, we have also shown that the differences among regions are not constant 
across gender, educational levels, or occupations. In those regions where Regional 
Governments have a higher weight in public employment, public wage gaps are higher 
and public employers pay higher returns. Despite significant differences in public and 
private sector wages across regions, there is however no trend towards reduction of regional 
wage differences in Spain. 
Finally, we have also found a cross-regional positive correlation between public 
wage gaps and unemployment and a negative one between labour productivity and 
public wage gaps. Although, there are alternative explanations of these two findings which 
could only be tested with more detailed data, the evidence do not reject the view that pay 
setting in the public sector could be creating some barriers for regional development, being by 
adjusting to a less extent to economic factors diverging across regions or by creating 
incentives for the selection of human capital into the public sector. 
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APPENDIX A: ESTIMATED WAGE REGRESSIONS 
            Table A.1a. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, full sample)  
 
  Public sector Private sector Selection equation (public sector) 
  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Male 0.099 10.25 0.240 40.32 Male -0.226 -12.14 
Secondary Education 0.110 2.84 0.121 6.08 Secondary Education 0.389 5.53 
University Education 0.305 8.04 0.250 11.64 University Education 0.758 12.06 
Permanent Contract 0.187 14.51 0.140 20.24 Married -0.176 -6.02 
Tenure 0.018 6.63 0.018 10.81 Number of children 0.016 1.53 
Tenure (square) -0.001 -4.37 0.000 -3.91 Age 0.096 14.70 
Managers 0.644 6.92 0.694 15.33 Age (square) -0.001 -10.26 
Professionals 0.199 3.73 0.345 12.48 Spouse with University  0.271 9.78 
Clerks -0.058 -1.02 0.235 7.73 Spouse with Second. Educ. 0.154 5.50 
Semi-skilled workers 0.117 1.97 0.107 4.10 Spouse in the Public S. 0.375 11.62 
Married 0.051 4.12 0.039 5.02 Capital Income 0.106 4.79 
Number of children 0.013 2.85 0.027 8.43 Saving rate -0.218 -1.26 
Age 0.009 2.27 0.029 15.52 Industry -1.445 -0.61 
Age (square) 0.000 -1.71 0.000 -13.98 Construction 1.633 0.70 
North x Second. Edu. -0.144 -2.85 -0.049 -1.74 Services -0.222 -0.93 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.177 -3.76 0.001 0.05 Non profit services 5.130 1.41 
        x Managers -0.074 -0.60 -0.121 -1.73 North x Second. Edu. 0.186 1.94 
        x Professionals 0.209 3.11 -0.197 -5.25         x Univers. Educ. 0.164 1.98 
        x Clerks 0.209 2.87 -0.031 -0.70 East x Second. Edu. 0.055 0.68 
        x Semi-skilled 0.122 1.67 -0.051 -1.52         x Univers. Educ. 0.224 3.18 
East x Second. Edu. -0.111 -2.52 -0.029 -1.29 South x Second. Edu. 0.143 1.80 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.207 -5.03 -0.026 -1.09          x Univers. Educ. 0.243 3.48 
        x Managers 0.024 0.22 -0.128 -2.50 Constant term -3.025 -1.57 
        x Professionals 0.175 2.91 -0.166 -5.37     
        x Clerks 0.158 2.43 -0.058 -1.66     
        x Semi-skilled 0.056 0.83 -0.049 -1.71 1uσ  0.367 37.00 
South x Second. Edu. -0.068 -1.60 -0.032 -1.37 2uσ  0.380 171.37 
         x Univers. Educ. -0.071 -1.79 0.014 0.55 1uερ  -0.618 -13.69 
         x Managers -0.369 -3.45 -0.120 -2.12 2uερ  -0.304 -11.71 
         x Professionals 0.077 1.36 -0.207 -6.68     
         x Clerks 0.149 2.39 -0.056 -1.59     
         x Semi-skilled -0.061 -0.96 -0.036 -1.27     
Constant term 6.738 57.61 5.758 143.89     
          
          
Number of obs = 28,238        
Wald chi2(54) = 3,823.52        
Prob > chi2 = 0        
Log likelihood   -24,114          
 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table A.1b) included. The constant term represents a woman with primary 
education, single, working in Madrid in a firm with less than 500 employees and in an unskilled position. Regional 
aggregation: NORTH (GALICIA, ASTURIAS, CANTABRIA), EAST (BASQUE COUNTRY, NAVARRE, LA RIOJA, ARAGON, 
CATALONIA, VALENCIA, BALEARIC ISLANDS), CENTER (CASTILLE-LEON, CASTILLE-LA MANCHA, EXTREMADURA),  
SOUTH (ANDALUSIA, MURCIA, CANARY ISLANDS) 
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          Table A.1b. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, full sample) 
                                                  Regional dummies 
  Public sector Private sector Selection equation 
(working in the public 
sector) 
  Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Andalusia  -0.162  -3.06  -0.115 -4.48 -0.275 -1.06 
Aragon  -0.158  -2.77  0.004 0.14 -0.140 -0.41 
Asturias  -0.121  -1.91  -0.066 -2.02 0.000 0.00 
Balearic Islands  -0.090  -1.49  -0.023 -0.80 0.288 1.00 
Canary Islands  -0.090  -1.67  -0.126 -4.78 -0.096 -0.40 
Cantabria  -0.115  -1.82  -0.153 -4.79 -0.103 -0.41 
Castille-Leon  -0.083  -1.53  -0.076 -2.81 -0.372 -1.02 
Castille-La Mancha  -0.148  -2.72  -0.146 -5.27 -0.265 -0.66 
Catalonia  -0.029  -0.52  0.105 4.01 0.008 0.02 
Valencia  -0.142  -2.51  -0.061 -2.37 -0.066 -0.24 
Extremadura  -0.335  -6.14  -0.143 -5.00 -0.387 -0.84 
Galicia  -0.192  -3.09  -0.217 -6.98 -0.247 -0.78 
Murcia  -0.220  -4.03  -0.175 -6.5 -0.160 -0.56 
Navarre  -0.032  -0.55  0.117 4.12 -0.105 -0.19 
Basque Country  0.113  1.92  0.149 5.43 -0.447 -1.06 
La Rioja  -0.189  -3.08  -0.006 -0.21 -0.421 -0.84 
Constant   6.738  57.61  5.758 143.89 -3.002 -1.57 
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                       Table A.2a. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, males) 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table A2.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with primary 
education, single, working in Madrid in a firm with less than 500 employees and in an unskilled position. 
  Public sector Private sector Selection equation (public sector) 
  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat 
       
Second. Educ. 0,139 2,71 0,127 5,16Second. Educ. 0,328 3,65
University Educ. 0,231 5,00 0,268 10,34University Educ. 0,645 8,27
Permanent Contract 0,182 9,76 0,123 14,48Marital Status -0,202 -5,28
Tenure 0,017 4,68 0,015 7,29Number of children -0,006 -0,52
Tenure (square) 0,000 -3,08 0,000 -1,77 Age 0,074 9,12
Managers 0,677 6,05 0,688 13,11 Age (square) -0,001 -5,81
Professionals 0,270 3,79 0,320 8,53Spouse with University  0,330 9,65
Clerks -0,058 -0,72 0,258 5,66Spouse with Second. Educ. 0,186 5,76
Semi-skilled workers 0,117 1,57 0,121 3,43Spouse in the Public S. 0,269 6,83
Marital Status 0,070 3,74 0,055 5,62Capital Income 0,082 3,13
Number of children 0,024 3,94 0,030 8,01 Saving rate -0,270 -1,15
Age 0,003 0,60 0,027 12,30Industry -2,501 -0,9
Age (square) 0,000 -0,39 0,000 -10,80Construction -0,166 -0,06
North x second. Edu. -0,216 -3,26 -0,072 -2,08Services -0,425 -0,15
        x univers. Educ. -0,232 -3,86 -0,037 -1,05Non profit services 6,943 1,61
        x Managers 0,022 0,15 -0,180 -2,28North x second. Edu. 0,206 1,71
        x Professionals 0,213 2,43 -0,216 -4,35         x univers. Educ. 0,135 1,31
        x Clerks 0,167 1,70 -0,089 -1,39East x second. Edu. 0,088 0,86
        x Semi-skilled 0,140 1,55 -0,104 -2,40        x univers. Educ. 0,155 1,75
East x second. Edu. -0,175 -3,00 -0,056 -2,01 South x second. Edu. 0,199 1,99
        x univers. Educ. -0,229 -4,41 -0,044 -1,52         x univers. Educ. 0,286 3,26
        x Managers 0,067 0,50 -0,142 -2,40Constant term -3,660 -1,62
        x Professionals 0,096 1,21 -0,142 -3,39    
        x Clerks 0,117 1,30 -0,057 -1,10    
        x Semi-skilled 0,046 0,55 -0,065 -1,71 1uσ  0,417 35,02
South x second. Edu. -0,146 -2,60 -0,020 -0,71 2uσ  0,375 136,75
         x univers. Educ. -0,089 -1,76 -0,015 -0,50 1uερ  -0,778 -30,98
         x Managers -0,420 -3,31 -0,074 -1,15 2uερ  -0,313 -9,15
         x Professionals -0,049 -0,65 -0,208 -5,02   
         x Clerks 0,147 1,70 -0,049 -0,95    
         x Semi-skilled -0,090 -1,13 -0,064 -1,71    
Constant term 7,093 53,71 6,003 117,84   
        
          
Number of obs = 18201        
Wald chi2(54) = 2108,5        
Prob > chi2 = 0        
Log likelihood   -15.172,51           
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               Table A.2b. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, males) 
                                                    Regional dummies 
  Public sector Private sector Selection equation 
(working in the public 
sector) 
  Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Andalusia -0.099 -1.31 -0.080 -2.26 -0.235 -0.77 
Aragon -0.134 -1.64 0.035 0.92 0.192 0.48 
Asturias -0.074 -0.85 -0.019 -0.43 0.391 0.96 
Balearic Islands -0.063 -0.74 -0.049 -1.2 0.194 0.57 
Canary Islands -0.054 -0.7 -0.143 -3.89 -0.260 -0.92 
Cantabria -0.105 -1.21 -0.076 -1.79 0.181 0.6 
Castille-Leon 0.013 0.17 -0.023 -0.63 -0.110 -0.26 
Castille-La Mancha -0.103 -1.32 -0.126 -3.36 -0.043 -0.09 
Catalonia 0.069 0.86 0.137 3.72 0.428 0.89 
Valencia -0.076 -0.94 -0.045 -1.24 0.202 0.63 
Extremadura -0.295 -3.77 -0.144 -3.75 -0.302 -0.56 
Galicia -0.205 -2.41 -0.172 -4.1 0.080 0.21 
Murcia -0.178 -2.3 -0.186 -5.02 0.132 0.39 
Navarre 0.018 0.22 0.138 3.54 0.519 0.81 
Basque Country 0.140 1.69 0.206 5.42 0.015 0.03 
La Rioja -0.148 -1.67 0.020 0.5 0.058 0.1 
Constant  7.093 53.71 6.003 117.84 -3.660 -1.62 
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                  Table A.3a. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, females) 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table A3.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with primary 
education, single, working in Madrid in a firm with less than 500 employees and in an unskilled position. 
  Public sector Private sector Selection equation (public sector) 
  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
       
Secondary Education 0.144 2.23 0.103 3.07 Second. Educ. 0.584 5.05 
University Education 0.407 6.16 0.212 5.60 University Educ. 1.061 9.89 
Permanent Contract 0.198 11.29 0.165 14.03 Married -0.128 -2.73 
Tenure 0.019 4.76 0.026 8.75 Number of children 0.070 3.81 
Tenure (square) -0.001 -3.20 -0.001 -4.54 Age 0.125 10.95 
Managers 0.612 3.41 0.715 5.73 Age (square) -0.001 -7.78 
Professionals 0.101 1.19 0.386 9.07 Spouse with University  0.161 3.42 
Clerks -0.067 -0.77 0.211 4.98 Spouse with Second. Educ. 0.099 1.95 
Semi-skilled workers 0.118 0.82 0.055 1.21 Spouse in the Public S. 0.475 9.77 
Married 0.031 1.86 0.021 1.69 Capital Income 0.142 3.66 
Number of children 0.002 0.24 0.019 3.06 Saving rate -0.031 -0.12 
Age 0.022 3.47 0.035 10.29 Industry 0.326 0.08 
Age (square) 0.000 -3.05 0.000 -10.00 Construction 4.549 1.15 
North x Second. Edu. -0.103 -1.18 -0.016 -0.32 Services -7.267 -1.74 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.117 -1.41 0.063 1.25 Non profit services 1.979 0.31 
        x Managers -0.315 -1.30 0.063 0.35 North x Second. Edu. 0.179 1.08 
        x Professionals 0.198 1.81 -0.177 -2.96         x Univers. Educ. 0.162 1.12 
        x Clerks 0.197 1.75 0.021 0.34 East x Second. Edu. -0.013 -0.10 
        x Semi-skilled 0.070 0.37 0.070 1.15         x Univers. Educ. 0.297 2.47 
East x Second. Edu. -0.083 -1.11 0.026 0.68 South x Second. Edu. -0.048 -0.36 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.165 -2.30 0.023 0.55          x Univers. Educ. 0.058 0.48 
        x Managers -0.094 -0.46 -0.101 -0.74 Constant term -1.019 -0.31 
        x Professionals 0.249 2.59 -0.229 -4.84     
        x Clerks 0.176 1.78 -0.087 -1.78     
        x Semi-skilled -0.088 -0.50 -0.038 -0.75 1uσ  0.326 35.29 
South x Second. Edu. -0.045 -0.63 -0.055 -1.37 2uσ  0.381 102.08
         x Univers. Educ. -0.070 -1.02 0.054 1.24 1uερ  -0.390 -4.12 
         x Managers -0.360 -1.70 -0.387 -2.54 2uερ  -0.273 -6.36 
         x Professionals 0.218 2.37 -0.202 -4.11    
         x Clerks 0.140 1.48 -0.048 -0.95    
         x Semi-skilled -0.057 -0.34 0.039 0.76    
Constant term 6.339 33.45 5.702 83.98    
         
          
Number of obs = 10,037        
Wald chi2(54) = 1,514.97        
Prob > chi2 = 0        
Log likelihood   -8,591.4          
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                       Table A.3b. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, females) 
                                                            Regional dummies 
  Public sector Private sector Selection equation 
(working in the public 
sector) 
  Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Andalusia -0.218 -2.98 -0.190 -5.01 -0.447 -0.96 
Aragon -0.179 -2.30 -0.039 -0.94 -1.002 -1.69 
Asturias -0.158 -1.72 -0.124 -2.39 -0.921 -1.51 
Balearic Islands -0.145 -1.72 0.016 0.38 0.704 1.39 
Canary Islands -0.114 -1.53 -0.094 -2.43 0.295 0.70 
Cantabria -0.099 -1.05 -0.292 -5.69 -0.803 -1.80 
Castille-Leon -0.166 -2.22 -0.196 -4.72 -1.072 -1.67 
Castille-La Mancha -0.183 -2.41 -0.177 -4.06 -0.873 -1.24 
Catalonia -0.130 -1.67 0.074 1.98 -0.858 -1.19 
Valencia -0.188 -2.42 -0.066 -1.77 -0.686 -1.44 
Extremadura -0.351 -4.65 -0.139 -3.02 -0.821 -1.00 
Galicia -0.173 -1.88 -0.285 -6.00 -1.085 -1.94 
Murcia -0.246 -3.20 -0.142 -3.50 -0.931 -1.85 
Navarre -0.120 -1.49 0.101 2.41 -1.617 -1.70 
Basque Country 0.079 0.97 0.056 1.38 -1.523 -2.06 
La Rioja -0.206 -2.49 -0.026 -0.59 -1.628 -1.86 
Constant  6.339 33.45 5.702 83.98 -1.019 -0.31 
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Table A.4. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, teaching) 
  Public sector Private sector Selection equation (public sector) 
  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Male -0.009 -0.60 0.116 5.95 Male -0.097 -2.09 
Secondary Education 0.168 3.65 0.170 5.44 Secondary Education 0.554 5.98 
University Education 0.441 8.21 0.270 6.15 University education 1.277 14.92 
Permanent contract 0.216 8.20 0.184 6.69 Married -0.151 -1.96 
Tenure 0.012 2.40 0.017 2.91 Number of children 0.041 1.63 
Tenure squared 0.000 -1.71 0.000 -0.32 Age 0.028 9.91 
Married 0.055 2.54 0.039 1.47 Spouse with University  0.166 2.44 
Number of children 0.002 0.25 0.046 4.08 Spouse with Second. Educ. 0.053 0.70 
Age 0.011 8.58 0.008 5.23 Spouse in the Public S. 0.486 7.17 
Andalusía 0.003 0.09 -0.266 -7.17 Capital Income -0.053 -0.89 
Aragón 0.081 2.05 -0.155 -3.46 Saving rate 0.307 0.66 
Asturias 0.198 4.32 -0.111 -1.54 Manufacturing 4.963 0.77 
Balearic Islands 0.027 0.54 -0.301 -4.97 Construction 0.030 0.00 
Canary Islands 0.136 3.71 -0.166 -3.32 Market services -3.606 -0.57 
Cantabria 0.114 2.46 -0.195 -3.39 Non-market services -3.378 -0.33 
Castille-Leon 0.148 3.60 -0.159 -2.66 Andalusia 0.406 0.58 
Castille-La Mancha 0.065 1.66 -0.420 -7.68 Aragón -1.020 -1.14 
Catalonia 0.016 0.52 -0.022 -0.72 Asturias -0.358 -0.39 
Valencia -0.083 -2.47 -0.134 -3.17 Balearic Islands 0.887 1.20 
Extremadura -0.011 -0.27 -0.161 -2.84 Canary Islands 1.080 1.66 
Galicia 0.005 0.15 -0.264 -5.47 Cantabria -0.573 -0.86 
Murcia 0.032 0.73 -0.317 -5.03 Castille-Leon -0.276 -0.29 
Navarre 0.041 0.96 -0.179 -3.15 Castille-La Mancha -0.069 -0.06 
Basque Country 0.210 5.00 -0.052 -1.27 Catalonia -1.109 -0.99 
La Rioja -0.117 -2.09 -0.293 -4.88 Valencia -0.269 -0.37 
Constant term 6.400 56.16 6.318 96.01 Extremadura 0.339 0.27 
      Galicia -0.229 -0.27 
      Murcia -0.024 -0.03 
      Navarre -1.447 -1.00 
Number of obs = 3,777    Basque Country -1.315 -1.17 
Wald chi2 = 603.94    La Rioja -1.437 -1.08 
Prob > chi2 = 0    Constant term -0.655 -0.13 
       1u
σ
0.302 52.20 
       2u
σ
0.400 37.91 
       1uερ -0.136 -1.06 
       2uερ -0.317 -2.72 
                
Notes: Time dummies included. The constant term represents a woman with primary education, single and working in Madrid. 
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Table A.5. Estimation of wage equations (switching model, health and social services) 
Notes: Time dummies included. The constant term represents a woman with primary education, single and working in 
Madrid 
  Public sector Private sector Selection equation (public sector) 
  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat
Male 0.160 5.26 0,150 4.05 Male -0.926 -14.26
Secondary Education 0.085 0.73 0,255 2.04 Secondary education -0.478 -1.46
University Education 0.387 4.61 0,356 3.23 Tertiary education -0.067 -0.25
Permanent contract 0.109 3.9 0,150 4.25 Married -0.111 -1.02
Tenure 0.023 3.46 0,025 2.98 Number of children -0.019 -0.53
Tenure squared -0.001 -3.4 -0,001 -2.65 Age 0.128 5.33
Married 0.026 0.94 0,051 1.4 Age squared -0.001 -3.57
Number of children 0.005 0.51 0,058 3.46 Spouse with University Educ. 0.350 3.59
Age 0.045 4.73 0,030 2.7 Spouse with Second. Educ. 0.106 1.01
Age squared 0.000 -4.52 0,000 -1.28 Spouse in the Public S. 0.383 4.34
North -0.014 -0.1 -0,810 1.03 Capital Income 0.008 0.10
North X Second. Educ. -0.094 -0.51 -0,547 -3.91 Saving rate -0.313 -0.58
North x Univers. Educ. -0.209 -1.44 0,168 -3.2 Manufacturing 3.604 1.91
East -0.041 -0.13 -0,145 -0.09 Construction 6.786 1.43
East x secondary studies 0.082 0.24 -0,065 -0.96 Market services 4.509 2.91
East x tertiary studies -0.077 -0.24 -0,012 -0.5 Non-market services 1.279 4.17
South -0.111 -0.69 -0,298 -1.27 North 0.065 0.15
South x secondary studies 0.046 0.23 -0,025 -1.92 North X Second. Educ. 0.659 1.25
South x tertiary studies -0.040 -0.24 -0,162 -0.18 North x Univers. Educ. 0.683 1.61
Constant term 6.017 25.63 5,864 25.54 East -1.912 -3.47
      East x Secondary Education 2.725 4.52
      East x University Education 2.553 4.59
      South -1.073 -2.76
Number of obs = 2,305    South x Secondary Educ. 1.250 2.70
Wald chi2 = 499.57    South x Univers. Educ. 1.671 4.37
Prob > chi2 = 0    Constant term -8.978 -4.95
       1uσ 0.302 33.78
       2uσ 0.410 41.16
       1uερ -0.249 -1.60
       2uερ -0.229 -2.18
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APPENDIX B: FURTHER RESULTS 
Table B1.a. Random effects GLS regressions 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table B1.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with primary 
education, single, working in Madrid in a firm with less than 500 employees and in an unskilled position. 
FULL SAMPLE PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
Variables Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. 
Public Sector 0.144 20.66     
Male 0.194 23.51 0.075 4.93 0.237 25.77 
Secondary Education 0.116 6.38 0.092 2.27 0.125 6.18 
University Education 0.219 10.22 0.219 5.34 0.219 8.87 
Permanent Contract 0.088 17.10 0.122 10.74 0.082 14.05 
Tenure 0.018 13.27 0.018 6.80 0.018 11.44 
Tenure (square) -0.001 -8.65 0.000 -3.89 -0.001 -7.64 
Managers 0.329 8.36 0.279 3.11 0.375 8.43 
Professionals 0.200 7.97 0.164 2.89 0.217 7.64 
Clerks 0.146 5.24 0.099 1.59 0.162 5.15 
Semi-skilled workers 0.058 2.35 0.041 0.64 0.065 2.40 
Married 0.042 5.12 0.084 5.51 0.029 3.14 
Age 0.045 20.60 0.028 6.07 0.045 18.54 
Age (square) 0.000 -17.29 0.000 -4.41 0.000 -15.98 
Number of children 0.006 1.69 -0.004 -0.69 0.012 2.88 
North x Second. Educ. -0.036 -1.42 -0.007 -0.13 -0.062 -2.17 
        x Univers. Educ. 0.014 0.47 0.045 0.82 -0.040 -1.15 
        x Managers -0.046 -0.78 -0.049 -0.42 -0.028 -0.40 
        x Professionals -0.068 -2.05 -0.022 -0.31 -0.126 -3.30 
        x Clerks -0.027 -0.71 -0.043 -0.54 -0.025 -0.55 
        x Semi-skilled -0.021 -0.69 -0.019 -0.24 -0.020 -0.58 
East x Second. Educ. -0.037 -1.81 -0.009 -0.19 -0.053 -2.32 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.039 -1.62 -0.030 -0.64 -0.054 -1.94 
        x Managers -0.078 -1.74 0.083 0.78 -0.122 -2.42 
        x Professionals -0.077 -2.77 0.061 0.94 -0.108 -3.43 
        x Clerks -0.044 -1.41 0.004 0.05 -0.046 -1.30 
        x Semi-skilled -0.015 -0.55 -0.007 -0.09 -0.024 -0.81 
South x Second. Educ. -0.023 -1.12 0.029 0.66 -0.044 -1.88 
         x Univers. Educ. 0.027 1.10 0.084 1.82 -0.020 -0.69 
         x Managers -0.125 -2.59 -0.230 -2.20 -0.112 -2.03 
         x Professionals -0.081 -2.90 -0.019 -0.31 -0.133 -4.17 
         x Clerks -0.041 -1.31 -0.003 -0.04 -0.049 -1.37 
         x Semi-skilled -0.026 -0.97 -0.021 -0.31 -0.030 -1.01 
Constant term 5.590 120.28 6.079 57.13 5.577 108.91 
uσ 0.305  0.288  0.306  
εσ 0.216  0.173  0.225  
ρ  (fraction of variance due to u) 0.667  0.735  0.649  
R2:  within 0.056  0.016  0.071  
          Between 0.525  0.568  0.460  
         Overall 0.511  0.491  0.450  
No. observations 28,238  6,925  21,313  
No. groups 8,135  2,048  6,740  
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Table B1.a. Random effects GLS regressions 
Regional dummies 
FULL SAMPLE PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
 Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. 
Andalusia -0.153  -5.46 -0.171 -2.66 -0.153 -4.99 
Aragon -0.029  -0.9 -0.161 -2.23 -0.014 -0.38 
Asturias -0.100  -2.73 -0.096 -1.24 -0.084 -2.07 
Balearic Islands -0.042  -1.20 -0.095 -1.19 -0.036 -0.96 
Canary Islands -0.141  -4.72 -0.126 -1.89 -0.147 -4.50 
Cantabria -0.144  -4.03 -0.035 -0.44 -0.165 -4.19 
Castille-Leon -0.086  -2.77 -0.102 -1.48 -0.091 -2.64 
Castille-La Mancha -0.162  -5.07 -0.196 -2.82 -0.166 -4.70 
Catalonia 0.058  2.00 -0.081 -1.18 0.093 2.96 
Valencia -0.122  -4.18 -0.200 -2.84 -0.114 -3.61 
Extremadura -0.202  -6.09 -0.341 -5.03 -0.166 -4.43 
Galicia -0.241  -7.25 -0.169 -2.24 -0.251 -6.88 
Murcia -0.197  -6.21 -0.223 -3.19 -0.184 -5.30 
Navarre 0.066  1.98 -0.063 -0.84 0.085 2.33 
Basque Country 0.092  2.90 0.046 0.61 0.111 3.23 
La Rioja -0.057  -1.60 -0.225 -2.74 -0.024 -0.63 
Constant term  5.590  120.28 6.079 57.13 5.577 108.91 
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                                       Table B2.a. Quartile regressions (25th quartile) 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table B2.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with primary 
education, single, working in Madrid in a firm with less than 500 employees and in an unskilled position.
 FULL SAMPLE PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
              
Variables Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
              
Public Sector 0.225 30.87     
Male 0.173 29.00 0.072 6.52 0.221 25.76 
Secondary Education 0.165 7.79 0.165 3.50 0.166 5.75 
University Education 0.306 13.31 0.412 9.16 0.240 7.39 
Permanent Contract 0.148 19.21 0.227 13.18 0.133 12.65 
Tenure 0.019 10.41 0.021 5.58 0.017 6.75 
Tenure (square) 0.000 -5.03 -0.001 -3.45 0.000 -3.17 
Managers 0.680 13.57 0.792 6.65 0.699 10.40 
Professionals 0.204 6.69 0.223 3.16 0.241 5.79 
Clerks 0.110 3.40 0.029 0.38 0.181 4.11 
Semi-skilled workers 0.104 3.60 0.197 2.47 0.082 2.15 
Married 0.038 4.85 0.056 3.71 0.032 2.87 
Age 0.031 16.40 0.026 6.03 0.035 13.20 
Age (square) 0.000 -14.30 0.000 -4.94 0.000 -11.85 
Number of children 0.022 6.95 0.017 3.11 0.021 4.46 
North x Second. Educ. -0.090 -3.04 -0.100 -1.56 -0.120 -2.94 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.006 -0.20 -0.125 -2.03 0.013 0.30 
        x Managers -0.211 -2.81 -0.198 -1.23 -0.207 -1.98 
        x Professionals 0.002 0.05 0.141 1.57 -0.146 -2.60 
        x Clerks 0.046 1.04 0.135 1.42 0.012 0.19 
        x Semi-skilled -0.038 -1.03 -0.033 -0.33 -0.013 -0.27 
East x Second. Educ. -0.072 -2.99 -0.047 -0.84 -0.084 -2.56 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.059 -2.26 -0.110 -2.10 -0.040 -1.08 
        x Managers -0.166 -2.91 -0.194 -1.35 -0.208 -2.74 
        x Professionals -0.029 -0.86 0.090 1.12 -0.117 -2.52 
        x Clerks -0.008 -0.21 0.037 0.43 -0.030 -0.61 
        x Semi-skilled -0.010 -0.31 -0.034 -0.38 -0.018 -0.42 
South x Second. Educ. -0.071 -2.89 -0.053 -1.00 -0.081 -2.40 
         x Univers. Educ. 0.032 1.21 -0.037 -0.73 0.024 0.64 
         x Managers -0.325 -5.29 -0.459 -3.33 -0.262 -3.12 
         x Professionals -0.038 -1.11 0.020 0.26 -0.142 -3.03 
         x Clerks 0.027 0.73 0.095 1.17 0.014 0.27 
         x Semi-skilled -0.016 -0.51 -0.173 -2.03 0.015 0.37 
Constant term 5.542 129.94 5.674 52.95 5.504 94.37 
       
Num. Obs 28,238  6,925  21,313  
Pseudo R2 0.292  0.332  0.229  
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                            Table B2.b. Quartile regressions (25th quartile) 
                                                                   Regional dummies 
 FULL SAMPLE PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
 Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Andalusia  -0.113  -4.07  -0.036  -0.51  -0.137  -3.70 
Aragon  -0.006  -0.20  -0.069  -0.92  0.023  0.57 
Asturias  -0.084  -2.40  -0.060  -0.72  -0.100  -2.08 
Balearic Islands  -0.003  -0.09  -0.016  -0.20  0.016  0.38 
Canary Islands  -0.131  -4.57  -0.023  -0.33  -0.151  -3.95 
Cantabria  -0.180  -5.25  -0.071  -0.87  -0.184  -3.98 
Castille-Leon  -0.095  -3.28  -0.010  -0.14  -0.122  -3.11 
Castille-La Mancha  -0.117  -3.97  -0.013  -0.19  -0.157  -3.91 
Catalonia  0.059  2.06  -0.032  -0.44  0.091  2.40 
Valencia  -0.065  -2.29  -0.077  -1.04  -0.052  -1.38 
Extremadura  -0.179  -5.95  -0.177  -2.48  -0.147  -3.55 
Galicia  -0.212  -6.30  -0.138  -1.70  -0.224  -4.95 
Murcia  -0.204  -7.03  -0.168  -2.35  -0.202  -5.17 
Navarre  0.135  4.41  0.065  0.86  0.189  4.61 
Basque Country  0.153  5.09  0.118  1.53  0.167  4.19 
La Rioja  -0.061  -1.95  -0.234  -2.96  -0.014  -0.33 
Constant term   5.542  129.94  5.674  52.95  5.504  94.37 
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                                     Table B3.a. Quartile regressions (50th quartile) 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table B3.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with primary 
education, single, working in Madrid in a firm with less than 500 employees and in an unskilled position. 
 FULL SAMPLE PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
              
Variables Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
              
Public Sector 0.176 25.33     
Male 0.181 31.05 0.066 6.24 0.227 38.90 
Secondary Education 0.120 5.78 0.215 4.59 0.106 5.42 
University Education 0.310 14.46 0.490 11.08 0.235 11.15 
Permanent Contract 0.114 15.60 0.190 11.42 0.104 15.04 
Tenure 0.020 11.32 0.020 5.57 0.018 10.24 
Tenure (square) 0.000 -4.74 -0.001 -3.79 0.000 -3.33 
Managers 0.755 15.46 0.720 6.13 0.831 18.30 
Professionals 0.309 10.57 0.235 3.38 0.370 13.35 
Clerks 0.148 4.60 -0.002 -0.03 0.203 6.65 
Semi-skilled workers 0.132 4.62 0.175 2.25 0.131 5.01 
Married 0.038 4.92 0.057 3.81 0.042 5.57 
Age 0.031 16.84 0.025 6.03 0.033 18.43 
Age (square) 0.000 -14.43 0.000 -4.64 0.000 -16.31 
Number of children 0.017 5.33 0.019 3.44 0.016 4.93 
North x Second. Educ. -0.011 -0.37 -0.144 -2.32 -0.025 -0.88 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.001 -0.03 -0.201 -3.44 0.035 1.22 
        x Managers -0.269 -3.68 -0.194 -1.25 -0.301 -4.26 
        x Professionals -0.053 -1.38 0.167 1.92 -0.265 -7.03 
        x Clerks -0.020 -0.46 0.105 1.11 -0.023 -0.52 
        x Semi-skilled -0.066 -1.81 0.019 0.20 -0.089 -2.64 
East x Second. Educ. -0.032 -1.34 -0.135 -2.46 -0.023 -1.04 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.040 -1.66 -0.208 -4.09 -0.002 -0.08 
        x Managers -0.176 -3.16 -0.131 -0.94 -0.251 -4.88 
        x Professionals -0.104 -3.20 0.129 1.64 -0.190 -6.15 
        x Clerks -0.037 -1.00 0.068 0.81 -0.036 -1.05 
        x Semi-skilled -0.063 -2.02 -0.050 -0.57 -0.088 -3.09 
South x Second. Educ. -0.019 -0.78 -0.084 -1.60 -0.012 -0.54 
         x Univers. Educ. 0.055 2.23 -0.058 -1.17 0.060 2.43 
         x Managers -0.286 -4.77 -0.467 -3.46 -0.249 -4.38 
         x Professionals -0.120 -3.70 0.039 0.52 -0.236 -7.56 
         x Clerks -0.051 -1.38 0.100 1.23 -0.053 -1.50 
         x Semi-skilled -0.060 -1.94 -0.140 -1.67 -0.062 -2.19 
Constant term 5.741 137.54 5.889 57.02 5.731 145.15 
       
Num. Obs 28,238  6,925  21,313  
Pseudo R2 0.336  0.349  0.270  
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                             Table B3.b. Quartile regressions (50th quartile) 
                                                    Regional Dummies 
 FULL SAMPLE PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
 Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Andalusia  -0.089  -3.25  -0.056  -0.83  -0.099  -3.88 
Aragon  -0.022  -0.74  -0.060  -0.83  -0.005  -0.19 
Asturias  -0.055  -1.6  0.002  0.03  -0.034  -1.03 
Balearic Islands  -0.020  -0.65  -0.016  -0.21  -0.012  -0.4 
Canary Islands  -0.127  -4.49  -0.030  -0.43  -0.142  -5.38 
Cantabria  -0.139  -4.09  -0.011  -0.14  -0.128  -4.02 
Castille-Leon  -0.066  -2.31  -0.013  -0.19  -0.061  -2.26 
Castille-La Mancha  -0.103  -3.53  -0.023  -0.32  -0.122  -4.42 
Catalonia  0.066  2.36  -0.005  -0.07  0.097  3.72 
Valencia  -0.061  -2.18  -0.053  -0.73  -0.056  -2.17 
Extremadura  -0.151  -5.07  -0.185  -2.67  -0.130  -4.55 
Galicia  -0.209  -6.29  -0.113  -1.42  -0.208  -6.7 
Murcia  -0.174  -6.07  -0.135  -1.94  -0.179  -6.64 
Navarre  0.117  3.88  0.038  0.52  0.160  5.68 
Basque Country  0.141  4.77  0.148  1.98  0.161  5.88 
La Rioja  -0.031  -0.98  -0.130  -1.67  0.013  0.43 
Constant term   5.741  137.54  5.889  57.02  5.731  145.15 
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                                      Table B4.a. Quartile regressions (75th quartile) 
 
Notes: Time and regional dummies (see Table B4.b) included. The constant term represents a worker with primary 
education, single, working in Madrid in a firm with less than 500 employees and in an unskilled position. 
 FULL SAMPLE PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
              
Variables Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
              
Public Sector 0.116 16.14     
Male 0.181 30.21 0.058 5.52 0.230 29.51 
Secondary Education 0.133 6.18 0.193 4.02 0.110 4.24 
University Education 0.338 15.73 0.453 10.03 0.305 11.29 
Permanent Contract 0.118 15.97 0.143 8.42 0.108 12.19 
Tenure 0.020 11.01 0.019 5.25 0.019 8.68 
Tenure (square) 0.000 -4.31 -0.001 -3.69 0.000 -2.51 
Managers 0.787 15.45 0.613 5.26 0.830 13.79 
Professionals 0.383 12.90 0.272 3.94 0.439 12.17 
Clerks 0.204 6.06 0.048 0.63 0.275 6.76 
Semi-skilled workers 0.094 3.16 0.110 1.42 0.078 2.24 
Married 0.046 5.65 0.046 2.98 0.047 4.63 
Age 0.027 14.22 0.022 5.46 0.027 11.58 
Age (square) 0.000 -11.69 0.000 -3.54 0.000 -9.83 
Number of children 0.020 6.00 0.007 1.30 0.026 6.14 
North x Second. Educ. -0.009 -0.30 -0.125 -1.98 0.001 0.02 
        x Univers. Educ. 0.002 0.06 -0.200 -3.49 -0.006 -0.16 
        x Managers -0.144 -1.89 0.014 0.09 -0.133 -1.42 
        x Professionals -0.029 -0.75 0.262 3.05 -0.232 -4.74 
        x Clerks -0.080 -1.71 0.093 0.97 -0.108 -1.82 
        x Semi-skilled -0.027 -0.72 0.183 1.91 -0.042 -0.93 
East x Second. Educ. -0.051 -2.08 -0.136 -2.41 -0.034 -1.15 
        x Univers. Educ. -0.040 -1.64 -0.179 -3.48 -0.033 -1.10 
        x Managers -0.082 -1.41 0.044 0.31 -0.160 -2.35 
        x Professionals -0.114 -3.45 0.185 2.38 -0.211 -5.25 
        x Clerks -0.042 -1.11 0.094 1.09 -0.084 -1.80 
        x Semi-skilled -0.016 -0.48 0.085 0.96 -0.028 -0.74 
South x Second. Educ. -0.028 -1.14 -0.060 -1.11 -0.023 -0.76 
         x Univers. Educ. 0.080 3.27 0.025 0.50 0.046 1.46 
         x Managers -0.223 -3.56 -0.353 -2.63 -0.206 -2.73 
         x Professionals -0.146 -4.48 0.012 0.16 -0.276 -6.84 
         x Clerks -0.104 -2.71 0.017 0.20 -0.101 -2.13 
         x Semi-skilled -0.027 -0.83 -0.020 -0.24 -0.020 -0.52 
Constant term 6.013 139.07 6.190 60.01 6.022 116.05 
       
Num. Obs 28,238  6,925  21,313  
Pseudo R2 0.377  0.339  0.333  
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                             Table B4.b. Quartile regressions (75th quartile) 
 FULL SAMPLE PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
 Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Andalusia  -0.093  -3.25  -0.115  -1.70  -0.096  -2.84 
Aragon  -0.052  -1.68  -0.173  -2.39  -0.034  -0.92 
Asturias  -0.030  -0.84  -0.114  -1.41  -0.031  -0.71 
Balearic Islands  -0.080  -2.43  -0.156  -2.05  -0.075  -1.94 
Canary Islands  -0.103  -3.49  -0.045  -0.65  -0.134  -3.81 
Cantabria  -0.114  -3.19  -0.130  -1.61  -0.118  -2.77 
Castille-Leon  -0.059  -1.96  -0.095  -1.37  -0.056  -1.56 
Castille-La Mancha  -0.115  -3.75  -0.104  -1.49  -0.124  -3.37 
Catalonia  0.063  2.13  -0.095  -1.33  0.086  2.50 
Valencia  -0.095  -3.26  -0.186  -2.59  -0.086  -2.50 
Extremadura  -0.165  -5.33  -0.225  -3.26  -0.135  -3.57 
Galicia  -0.208  -5.96  -0.143  -1.81  -0.215  -5.15 
Murcia  -0.169  -5.64  -0.146  -2.09  -0.177  -4.96 
Navarre  0.074  2.36  -0.044  -0.60  0.088  2.34 
Basque Country  0.124  4.04  0.026  0.35  0.135  3.72 
La Rioja  -0.050  -1.54  -0.236  -3.06  -0.016  -0.42 
Constant term   6.013  139.07  6.190  60.01  6.022  116.05 
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